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NO. 31 JULY 2019 Introduction 
Istanbul Election: Remaking of Turkey’s 
New Political Landscape? 
Galip Dalay 
Istanbul’s fiercely fought municipal election is over. The opposition candidate, Ekrem 
İmamoğlu, won a landslide victory over his rival. The governing Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AK Party) has arguably suffered its most severe defeat since coming to 
power in 2002. The repercussions and reverberations of this election will be deeply felt 
across the political spectrum in Turkey. This election will have a formative impact on 
this new period of Turkish politics. Turkey has gained new political actors, for exam-
ple İmamoğlu, as a result of this election. The same election has also further opened 
the way for contestations on the conservative end of the political spectrum. Former 
President Abdullah Gül, former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and former Minis-
ter of Economy Ali Babacan are set to break away from the AK Party and form their 
own political movements. 
Whether this defeat will lead to a new period of irreversible decline for the ruling 
AK Party is dependent on what lessons President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan draws from 
this defeat. Palliative and tactical steps cannot reverse his party’s political decline. 
Yet, Erdoğan’s ability to undertake necessary reforms and introduce course-rectifying 
measures is significantly constrained, given the nature of his alliance with the National-
ist Movement Party (MHP), the de-institutionalisation of his party, and the personali-
sation of power in Turkey. As Erdoğan’s grip on power and Turkish politics is weak-
ened, the search for new political alternatives – both at the nation-wide level more 
broadly as well as on the conservative end of the political spectrum in particular – 
will gain momentum. These developments, in return, are sowing the seeds of a new 
political landscape in Turkey. 
 
On 23 June 2019, Turkey’s ruling party lost 
control of Istanbul to opposition candidate 
Ekrem İmamoğlu, a member of the Repub-
lican People’s Party (CHP). This followed an 
electoral battle of more than six months, 
which included the period of campaigning 
for the local election of 31 March and the 
rerun election in Istanbul on 23 June. The 
gap between İmamoğlu and his main rival, 
former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, was 
around 9 per cent. Whereas İmamoğlu gar-
nered 54 per cent of the vote, Yıldırım 
received around 45 per cent – according 
to the unofficial results. What made this 
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victory for the opposition and defeat for the 
governing AK Party more meaningful and 
consequential is the fact that İmamoğlu 
had to win the same local election twice in 
order to become the mayor of Istanbul. He 
had won the local election in Istanbul on 
31 March with a margin of around 0.16 per 
cent of the vote. Yet, the government – 
with the support of its ally, the far-right 
MHP – disputed the results and made an 
appeal to the Supreme Election Board (YSK) 
on tenuous charges of electoral fraud and 
irregularities to rerun the election in Istan-
bul. In response, the YSK annulled the 
electoral outcome solely for the post of 
metropolitan mayor – despite the fact that 
citizens had cast their votes for all of the 
following posts in the same envelope: 
metropolitan mayors, district municipality 
mayors, city councils, and mukhtars (neigh-
bourhood representatives). 
Scrapping the outcomes for the metro-
politan mayoral elections paved the way for 
the rerun of the election in Istanbul on 23 
June, and hence the governing coalition’s 
major defeat at the polls. This decision was 
regarded to be political rather than legal – 
across the board. This has created a sense 
that electoral injustice is being committed 
against the opposition candidate. This sense 
of injustice – which helped to consolidate 
the social base of the opposition bloc and 
further disillusioned a segment of educated 
upper-middle-class conservative voters, cou-
pled with İmamoğlu’s dynamic campaign 
strategy and Kurdish dissatisfaction with 
the ruling party – worked in favour of İma-
moğlu and contributed to Yıldırım’s final 
and decisive defeat in the race. A compari-
son between the electoral outcomes of 31 
March and 23 June confirms this. Although 
the difference between both candidates’ 
votes on 31 March stood at around 13,000, 
this gap increased to around 800,000 on 23 
June – in both cases in favour of İmamoğlu. 
Despite being local elections, both the 
local election on 31 March in Turkey and 
the rerun election on 23 June in Istanbul 
were fought on national terms. The national 
implications of İmamoğlu’s win in Istanbul 
and the opposition’s broader victories across 
Turkey are attracting even more curiosity 
and scrutiny than the local ramifications. 
In any case, the election of 23 June is a 
historic moment that will have far-reaching 
consequences for Turkey. The governing 
AK Party has arguably suffered its most se-
vere defeat since coming to power in 2002. 
Whether this will be the start of a new 
trend for the governing AK Party and its 
coalition partner, the MHP (which together 
form the People’s Alliance), is dependent on 
what lessons President Erdoğan will draw 
from this defeat and what policy and politi-
cal responses he will offer. This concerns, 
in particular, what he will do to rejuvenate 
and institutionalise his party, whether he 
will reach out to the AK Party’s previous 
political elites to prevent the emergence of 
new political parties, and whether he will 
change his style of polarising politics and 
personalised governance, as populist poli-
tics in Turkey appear to have reached their 
climax. But one thing that is clear is that 
Turkish politics have entered a new phase, 
and Erdoğan cannot reverse his party’s 
political decline with mere palliative and 
tactical steps. However, even if he diagnoses 
the situation accurately and draws the rights 
lessons from this defeat, his room for re-
form and manoeuvre is severely limited, 
given the nature of his alliance with the 
nationalist MHP, the de-institutionalisation 
of his party, and the personalisation of 
power in Turkey. His political choices in 
recent years have created path dependen-
cies that cannot be easily reversed. 
Reverse of Turkey’s 1994 Moment 
The symbolism of this election was unmis-
takeable. Municipal elections normally 
have a limited impact on the political direc-
tion of a country. Yet, in post–Cold War 
Turkey, two municipal elections – in 1994 
and 2019 – proved otherwise. In the local 
elections of 1994, the pro-Islamic Welfare 
Party (Refah Partisi) won the municipalities 
of the country’s two largest cities: Istanbul 
and Ankara. The then young and charis-
matic 40-year-old, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
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became mayor of Istanbul, which was the 
start of a journey that later took him to the 
top of the political pyramid in the country. 
Melih Gökçek won the municipality of 
Ankara – a position that he retained until 
2017. This election marked the clearest 
manifestation of the advent of “political 
Islam” in Turkish politics and set in motion 
a series of events that gave birth to the AK 
Party, which has ruled the country since 
2002. The political discussions in the media, 
think tank circles, and academia that 
followed the 1994 election, both in Turkey 
and abroad, were not about the municipal 
management of Istanbul and Ankara, but 
rather focussed on the political orientation 
and future of Turkey. 
The municipal elections of 31 March 
2019, particularly with regard to the rerun 
of the Istanbul election on 23 June, have a 
similar flavour. Instead of just pertaining 
to the municipalities, the result of this elec-
tion is a strong indication of the political 
course of the country from here onwards. 
In the end, after the change of the political 
system from a parliamentary to a super 
powerful executive presidency on 16 April 
2017, the post of mayor of Istanbul has 
arguably become the second most impor-
tant political post in the country – bearing 
in mind that the vice president is an un-
elected figure and the parliament has lost 
much of its political weight. Given this fact, 
it is highly likely that the new figures rising 
in Turkish politics will come mostly through 
the municipalities. In Turkey, politics is not 
only local, but will increasingly become 
more municipal. 
This election is set to bring major con-
sequences on multiple levels. 
Nation-wide Implications 
First, the rerun of the Istanbul election was 
just the latest in a series of major initiatives 
that Erdoğan has undertaken in recent 
years to increase the longevity and durabil-
ity of his power, but which have produced 
the reverse effects. To be more specific, 
from forming an alliance with the MHP 
to changing Turkey’s political system to 
rerunning Istanbul’s municipal election, 
Erdoğan has been trying to secure and 
prolong his political power. Yet, all these 
steps have proven to be grave mistakes that 
have weakened his power base. To start 
with, the alliance with the MHP has dra-
matically reduced the AK Party’s political 
flexibility. The clearest manifestation of 
this occurred in the aftermath of the local 
election on 31 March. Following the elec-
tion, Erdoğan spoke of the necessity of 
forming a “Turkey alliance” in order to deal 
with the country’s burgeoning challenges. 
Yet, the MHP saw this as the government/ 
Erdoğan testing the grounds to explore the 
possibility of forming a closer working rela-
tionship with the opposition, if not outright 
replacing the MHP with a new political ally. 
Alarmed by this move, the MHP leader 
rebuffed this proposal outright and called 
upon the AK Party to be more straightfor-
ward about its alliance with the MHP. Faced 
with what came across as an ultimatum 
from the MHP, Erdoğan and AK Party offi-
cials gave up on their idea of forming a new 
political ally and renewed their pledge to 
continue their alliance with the MHP. The 
cost of this alliance has been multifold. 
Electorally, this alliance – coupled with 
the government’s nationalist turn – has 
driven wedges between the Kurds, educated 
middle-class conservatives, and the AK 
Party. The loss of major cities (Istanbul, An-
kara, Antalya, Adana, and Mersin) was the 
electoral outcome of this alliance. In a sense, 
the alliance that Erdoğan had pinned his 
hopes on to win the local elections turned 
out to have cost him those same elections. 
Policy-wise, this alliance – coupled with 
the government’s nationalist, regressive, 
and anti-democratic turns in recent years – 
has dramatically reduced the government’s 
scope for policy choices, particularly the 
ones that will conflict with the MHP’s po-
litical preferences. This, in turn, has aggra-
vated Turkey’s political and economic woes 
and further undermined the government as 
well as Erdoğan’s political appeal. 
Likewise, the new political system, which 
requires contenders to win more than 50 
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per cent of the vote in order to become 
president, makes Erdoğan dependent on 
alliances. Given the increasingly close vote 
share of the People’s Alliance and the oppo-
sition, which roughly stands at around 
51 to 52 per cent versus 48 to 49 per cent, 
respectively, puts the future of Erdoğan’s 
power at risk and in doubt. In particular, 
the increasingly visible split within the AK 
Party casts further doubt on the future of 
Erdoğan’s political power. In contrast, in a 
parliamentary system, the AK Party would 
have maintained its power with a much 
lower share of the vote total. There would 
have been less of a need to form alliances 
in order to continue ruling the country. 
Lastly, the decision to rerun the Istanbul 
election has further tainted the AK Party’s 
political standing – it lost the political and 
moral high ground to the opposition, made 
the divisions within conservative circles 
more visible and louder, and cast İmamoğlu 
as the new underdog of the political system. 
The End of the AK Party’s 
Political Hegemony 
Second, since coming to power in 2002, the 
governing AK Party has maintained both 
numerical and political hegemony in Turk-
ish politics. It was the agenda-setter. It 
defined the political framework in which 
Turkish politics operated. The opposition 
usually played the game that the govern-
ment put forward. Yet, the recent local 
election and developments since then are 
changing this: The government is losing its 
ability to set the agenda. Instead, in many 
instances, the government has copied the 
opposition’s political initiatives and strat-
egies. The stark differences in the govern-
ment’s pre- and post-March election strat-
egies and narratives are illustrative of the 
AK Party’s loss of status as the main agenda-
setter in Turkish politics. 
Prior to 31 March, the government had 
once again bet on the politics of polarisa-
tion, adopted a highly nationalistic and 
anti-Kurdish discourse, and portrayed the 
election in national rather than local terms. 
In contrast, the opposition has struck a 
conciliatory chord, played down the politics 
of polarisation, and put the spotlight on 
its candidates rather than chairpersons of 
the political parties that formed the oppo-
sition block. Whereas Erdoğan – and to a 
lesser extent Devlet Bahçeli, chairman of 
the MHP – was the face of the People’s 
Alliance’s municipal election campaign, the 
municipal candidates were the faces of the 
opposition block’s election strategy. Like-
wise, whereas the People’s Alliance invested 
in the increasing polarisation and solidifi-
cation of the political and identity divides 
of Turkey in order to secure victory, the op-
position block saw its fortune in lowering 
the level of polarisation and de-solidifying 
the political and identity divides of the coun-
try – given that the opposition needed to 
gain votes beyond its traditional base to win. 
When the opposition strategy worked, 
the People’s Alliance changed strategy in 
the aftermath of 31 March and prior to the 
rerun of the mayoral election in Istanbul. 
Putting aside the week prior to the election 
on 23 June, the government put the spot-
light on its candidate, Binali Yıldırım, 
rather than on Erdoğan; struck a conciliatory 
tone; tried to mend ties with the Kurds; and 
tried to prioritise local issues over national 
ones in a new campaign strategy. In a sense, 
the People’s Alliance’s post-March election 
strategy was the opposite of its pre-March 
strategy and resembled that of the opposi-
tion camp. It is a novelty for the opposition 
to be playing the pro-active and agenda-
setting role in Turkish politics. This, in 
return, is bringing both an electoral (nu-
merical) and political balance to Turkish 
politics and contributing to the country’s 
democratic resilience. It seems that the gov-
ernment can no longer singlehandedly 
decide on the parameters of Turkish politics 
and define the rules of the game. 
The Emergence of 
New Political Actors 
Third, with the weakening of the govern-
ment’s political dominance, the public 
 SWP Comment 31 
 July 2019 
 5 
sphere and public discussions are likely to 
become more varied. As a corollary to this, 
the government is likely to face more pub-
lic criticism from different corners of Turk-
ish society and politics. There are already 
ample early indications of this trend in the 
immediate aftermath of the election on 31 
March. Casting aside its docile posturing 
vis-à-vis the government, Turkey’s largest 
business association, the Turkish Industry 
and Business Association (TÜSIAD), esca-
lated its criticism of the government’s 
actions, particularly its decision to rerun 
the Istanbul election. Former high-profile 
AK Party politicians have become more 
vocal and public in their criticisms of the 
government and President Erdoğan. A 
chunk of the conservative media circle 
and journalists have also followed suit. 
In a similar vein, the political cost for 
new actors to enter the political sphere has 
diminished. This is particularly important 
for the internal divides within conservative 
and government circles. In recent years, 
there has been growing political dissatisfac-
tion among some AK Party political elites 
about the party and the country’s political 
direction. Three names have been particu-
larly important in this regard: Abdullah 
Gül, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Ali Babacan. 
Because they are losing hope for the pos-
sibility of change and reform within the AK 
Party, these figures are opting for solutions 
outside of the party. To that end, they are 
working on two separate political initia-
tives: One of them is being led by Babacan 
and Gül, and the other one by Davutoğlu. 
The result of the Istanbul election will 
provide more motivation and fuel for these 
initiatives. As a reflection of this, the split 
from the AK Party will become more visible, 
if not institutionalised. In April, Davutoğlu 
already published his political manifesto, 
which was highly critical of the govern-
ment’s political direction. This manifesto 
can also be seen as providing a framework 
for Davutoğlu’s political activism in the 
coming period. Likewise, Babacan resigned 
from the AK Party. In his letter of resigna-
tion, he gave strong indications of forming 
a new party. This, in return, will dent Erdo-
ğan’s appeal and weaken the AK Party’s 
political monopoly over Turkish politics, 
but particularly over the conservative end 
of the political spectrum. 
The Kurds As the Kingmaker of 
Turkish Politics 
Fourth, it is arguable that one of the moti-
vations for the MHP and AK Party alliance 
to change the political system was that, in 
the new presidential system, Kurdish politi-
cal actors and pro-Kurdish parties were sup-
posed to be marginalised when it came to 
deciding about the country’s power struc-
ture. The assumption was that Turkish poli-
tics is roughly made up of two main histori-
cal and identity blocks: a 60–65 per cent 
conservative-nationalist block versus a 35–
40 per cent secularist-leftist block. In this 
scenario, the conservative-nationalist block 
was expected to comfortably rule the coun-
try for the foreseeable future. Moreover, ac-
cording to this view, any alliance with the 
pro-Kurdish parties was deemed to be costly 
for whichever side formed it – hence, it was 
anticipated that both ends of the Turkish 
political spectrum would avoid the Kurds. 
This was not a completely baseless calcula-
tion. In fact, in forming the alliances, both 
the People’s Alliance and the Nation Alliance 
(opposition block) avoided engaging in any 
formal relationships with the pro-Kurdish 
Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Despite 
the fact that Kurdish support was the most 
decisive factor in the opposition block win-
ning the major cities, most notably in Istan-
bul, this block still felt uncomfortable ac-
knowledging this support publicly. 
In spite of the opposition’s stance, the 
Kurds voted for the opposition CHP candi-
dates en masse. More than helping the oppo-
sition to win, the motivation for the Kurds 
was to defeat the AK Party and MHP coali-
tion – hence weakening Erdoğan and the 
AK Party’s grip on power. In fact, the pro-
Kurdish party set two primary goals for 
itself in this election: to make the govern-
ment lose control of the major cities in the 
western part of the country, and to win 
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back the municipalities from the govern-
ment-appointed trustees in the Kurdish-
majority regions in the east and south-
east. Regarding the former goal, the HDP 
achieved its aims; regarding the latter one, 
it fell short of the goal it had set for itself. 
But overall, the HDP proved to be a durable 
and decisive actor in Turkish politics. 
Far from being a marginalised force in 
Turkish politics, the Kurds played the role 
of kingmaker in this local election. The 
People’s Alliance’s tactic of criminalising 
and securitising Kurdish politics backfired. 
The frenetic move by the government to 
appeal for Kurdish votes and even try to 
enlist support from the leader of the Kurdi-
stan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, 
as a last resort to prevent the Kurds from 
voting for the opposition candidate, Ekrem 
İmamoğlu, in Istanbul was revealing. 
New Sociological or 
Political Reality? 
No doubt that the Kurds on their own can-
not decide who will rule the country. But 
what is increasingly becoming clear is that 
the Kurds, particularly the pro-Kurdish 
HDP, have sufficient power to decide who 
will not come to power. In this regard, 
Kurdish support is both an opportunity as 
well as a challenge for the opposition. The 
opposition needs to develop a Kurdish 
policy that can at least partially meet Kurd-
ish cultural and political demands. It needs 
to bear in mind that the opposition’s vic-
tories in municipal elections were not the 
outcome of a new sociological reality, but 
rather the result of a new political reality. 
This new political reality is related to 
alliance politics, in which Turkish politics 
is, broadly speaking, divided into two main 
camps: the People’s Alliance (the governing 
coalition) versus the Nation Alliance (the 
opposition grouping). The Kurds throwing 
their weight behind the Nation Alliance 
was the most decisive factor in tipping the 
balance in its favour in the local elections. 
Such nature of these opposition victories 
in this election makes them fragile, not 
solid, in the absence of a well-developed 
Kurdish policy by the opposition. It was the 
HDP’s motivation of defeating Erdoğan that 
was the Kurd’s major driving force for effec-
tively allying with the opposition in the 
local elections. But this driving force might 
not be as long-lasting as many think if 
Turkey and the Syrian Kurds find a modus 
vivendi between themselves to move beyond 
their current conflictual relationship, and 
in the absence of a coherent Kurdish policy 
from the opposition. The opposition can no 
longer easily escape the necessity of devel-
oping a Kurdish policy. This policy, or its 
lack thereof, will define the future of co-
operation with the Kurdish opposition. 
The Meaning of İmamoğlu’s Victory 
This election will have a formative impact 
on this new period of Turkish politics. İma-
moğlu differs from other opposition actors 
in one main way: He can overcome the 
political constraints of opposition politics 
by appealing to voters who have tradition-
ally not belonged to the constituencies of 
the opposition parties. In spite of this, what 
İmamoğlu means for the future of Turkish 
politics is still unclear and in the making. 
He has deftly diagnosed the political vacuum 
in Turkey. Such an accurate diagnosis – 
coupled with being the underdog of the sys-
tem after the annulment of the March elec-
tion results in Istanbul – helped him to 
win a landslide victory over his rival. It is 
not clear yet whether İmamoğlu will prove 
to be the figure that fills the burgeoning 
political vacuum or whether he will be the 
gate-opener for others to fill this vacuum. 
Is the AK Party Capable of 
Reforming Itself? 
As regards the governing party and Erdo-
ğan, these are the questions they need 
to ask themselves: What was defeated in 
Istanbul? Was it the AK Party’s candidate 
for a municipal post who was defeated? Is 
this the political trajectory of the govern-
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ment in recent years? Is this due to the 
AK Party’s current politics? It is crucial for 
the AK Party to find more clarity about 
what they think was defeated in Istanbul 
on 23 June. 
The easier answer is to say that the AK 
Party’s municipal candidate was defeated 
by İmamoğlu. Blaming the defeat on 
Yıldırım might be seen by the governing 
cadres as a convenient option. But it is clear 
that Yıldırım’s loss to İmamoğlu is only 
part of the story, arguably a minor part. 
What happened on 23 June in Istanbul was 
much more than this. The fact that the 
election was fought on national terms 
rather than local ones; that Erdoğan was 
the most prominent face of the governing 
coalition’s campaign; that the AK Party’s 
nationalist turn and its alliance with the 
MHP were what primarily drove the Kurds 
to vote for İmamoğlu; and that a segment 
of the educated middle-class conservative 
voters have grown increasingly dissatisfied 
with the AK Party as a result of Erdoğan’s 
discourse and the political trajectory of the 
government and the AK Party in recent 
years all indicate what was primarily de-
feated in Istanbul on 23 June: namely, the 
nationalist and polarising populist politics 
of the government and the AK Party as well 
as Erdoğan’s political parlance, his leader-
ship style of recent years, and his alliance 
with the MHP. 
However, even if the AK Party asks the 
right questions and makes accurate assess-
ments of the defeat and the overall political 
situation, it is still not clear whether it can 
develop an appropriate prescription for the 
issue and implement it. There is likely to 
be a gap between diagnosis, prescription, 
and implementation. Erdoğan’s room for 
manoeuvre is not that wide, given the 
nature of his alliance with the MHP, his 
political course of recent years, and due 
to the growing distance between him and 
most of the AK Party’s previous political 
elites. 
Conclusion 
In recent years, particularly since the coup 
attempt in 2016, Turkey has experienced 
fast-paced democratic regression, political 
decay in concurrence with the country’s 
authoritarian turn, and economic deteriora-
tion. These developments have arisen in a 
context where the AK Party and President 
Erdoğan had almost a complete monopoly 
over Turkish politics. With the recent elec-
tion in Istanbul, the AK Party’s power mo-
nopoly has been diminished – new actors 
are, and will be, entering the Turkish politi-
cal and public spheres. Istanbul has gen-
erally played the role of trend-setter in 
Turkish politics. It appears that it will again 
play the same role. 
Scenarios 
∎ One of the immediate manifestations of 
the political course that the government 
will take will be defined by its approaches 
to the newly elected mayors, particularly 
those of Istanbul and Ankara. The gov-
ernment controls the financial resources 
and has the legal means to undermine 
the performances of the new mayors. 
There have been reports that the gov-
ernment is contemplating the transfer 
of some mayoral authority to municipal 
assemblies, where the governing party 
has the majority, and to the governors, 
who are appointed by the central gov-
ernment. If this scenario materialises, 
this means that the government will not 
rectify its political course of recent years, 
and that tensions between the govern-
ment and opposition and political polari-
sation will continue unabated. 
∎ The discontent within the AK Party 
will likely give birth to new parties. The 
result of the Istanbul election is set to 
accelerate this. Currently, Davutoğlu and 
Babacan are leading two separate politi-
cal initiatives. Babacan resigned from the 
AK Party. Davutoğlu has been vocal in 
his criticism of the government. Once 
these political initiatives are formalised 
and institutionalised, this will bring 
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more plurality to Turkey’s political scene 
and terminate Erdoğan’s monopoly over 
the conservative end of the political spec-
trum. 
∎ The combined impacts of the above two 
scenarios will be a further decline in the 
political fortunes of the AK Party and 
President Erdoğan. 
∎ The Kurds are increasingly playing the 
role of kingmaker in Turkish politics. 
One of the major factors that could 
shape the future of Turkish politics is 
whether the pro-Kurdish HDP’s alliance 
with the opposition is sustainable. In 
contrast, the challenge for Erdoğan will 
be whether he can drive a wedge be-
tween the Kurds and the opposition – 
without Kurdish support, the opposi-
tion’s chance of defeating Erdoğan is still 
limited. Two factors will be decisive for 
this issue. First, the opposition has thus 
far only shown the gesture of goodwill 
towards the Kurds, but it does not have 
a Kurdish policy and is unlikely to have 
one soon. From their stance on the 
Syrian Kurds to the fate of the impris-
oned Kurdish politicians in Turkey, the 
opposition will come under increasing 
pressure to develop a Kurdish policy. The 
more likely scenario is that the opposi-
tion CHP will have an ad hoc policy on 
Kurdish issues. Second, whether Turkey 
and the Syrian Kurds can move beyond 
the current conflictual relationship is 
another factor that will define the place 
of the HDP in Turkish politics. The chal-
lenge that Erdoğan faces is that he can-
not continue his alliance with the MHP 
and initiate a political opening to the 
Kurds in Turkey and Syria at the same 
time. Therefore, the most likely scenario 
is that the HDP’s alliance with the oppo-
sition will continue, but it will be fragile. 
The Istanbul election has ended the 
political monopoly of the governing party 
and Erdoğan. Yet, it has not set a clear path 
for Turkish politics. The future course will 
be shaped by the actions and interactions of 
the incumbent political class, such as Erdo-
ğan, Bahçeli, the CHP leadership, and Kurd-
ish political actors; critical political actors 
within conservative circles such as Davu-
toğlu, Babacan, and Gül; and emerging 
faces such as İmamoğlu. Such a multiplica-
tion of political actors in itself illustrate the 
end of an era in Turkey – when Erdoğan 
and the AK Party had an almost complete 
monopoly over Turkish politics. 
Galip Dalay is the IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at SWP.  
The Mercator IPC Fellowship Programme at SWP is funded by Stiftung Mercator. 
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